



independent institute for  
**SOCIAL POLICY**

## **Labor Markets for Alternative Civilian Service**

**Tatyana Maleva (Project Leader),  
Lilia Ovtcharova,  
Alina Pishniak,  
Oksana Sinyavskaya,  
Sergey Smirnov**

**Moscow, 2002**

## **Introduction**

---

Russian Federation Constitution guarantees the right to alternative civilian service. Its Article 59 says that «*If military service for a citizen of the Russian Federation is in conflict with his convictions or religion, and also in some other cases set forth in the federal law, then he has the right to alternative civilian service.* This provision has been applied until recently to the number of Articles, which were only a «protocol for intentions» but not a guide to action.

Independent Institute for Social Policy (IISP) has developed this document to study labor and economic aspects of alternative civilian service (ACS) although it was a priori obvious that this problem greatly depended on some political and social factors.

What is the potential number of the ACS workers? How many call-up age young people will prefer the ACS to the military service? Who are they? What is their social portrait? What do their intentions depend on? These questions form *the first block of problems* included in the Institute's study.

*The second block of problems* pertains to the ACS labor market. What kind of labor market will be suggested to the future ACS workers? What jobs not requiring special knowledge and skills can the State offer to them? How can we determine their social utility?

*The third block of problems* is associated with economic efficiency of the ACS and expenses from the State budget.

Whether the ACS will be a heavy burden on the State, which will make the governmental authorities reject or even block it or the ACS will afford a new segment on labor market to fill existing lacunas and to close gap in labor force for unattractive but socially useful and necessary jobs, depends on solution of these problems.

Independent Institute for Social Policy has prepared this Project for social and economic assessment of labor markets in the Russian Federation for alternative civilian service as well as for evaluation of sizes and distribution of possible financial burdens between regions.

The Project was based on:

1. Results of representative sample surveys of call-up individuals. The Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research (VCIOM) has performed this survey in April 2002, during which 1,205 males aged 16-28 and 401 parents who have sons of call-up age have been interviewed.
2. Qualitative sociological researches have been carried out. Interviewed have been:
  - Conscripts who applied to the appropriate authorities for alternative civilian service and also those who are ready to do this<sup>1</sup>.
  - Senior pupils who are close to call-up age.
  - Call-up age students who study in academies having no military chairs.
  - Officials of regional (inter-regional) military registration and enlistment offices of Moscow (involved three offices in Western, North-Eastern, Southern regions of Moscow);
  - Potential employers, i.e., top-managers of medical and social institutions as obviously most suitable for the ACS workers.
3. Special pilot surveys of labor markets performed by the IISP in July-August 2002 in two regions (city of Vladimir and Leningrad oblast).
4. State Employment Services' data about the number and structure of vacancies on local labor markets, which have been collected according to the technique developed by the IISP experts for

---

<sup>1</sup> A part of them has already various contacts with official authorities in this regard.

73 regions of Russia.

This publication synthesizes the results of the projects, which have been implemented thanks to a financial support from the Moscow Public Science Foundation (USAID financing) and the “Sozidanie” Interregional Charitable Institution.

The authors express their gratitude to interviewers, respondents and to all other participants of the study, which efforts helped shed light on the problem being a principally new for up-to-date Russia both in political aspect and from positions of labor market.

## **1. Labor market for alternative civilian service: general methodological approaches**

Basic provisions of the Federal Law “On Alternative Civilian Service” define total structure of labor market for alternative civilian service. Par. 1 of Article 1 of the Law says that this service is «a special kind of labor activity in the interests of society and State, which is carried out by citizens instead of military service. Par. 1 of Article 3 says that “males aged 18-27 who are not in reserve, have the right to alternative civilian service if they personally applied for this service and got a positive decision from the draft board”.

In general, demand and supply form labor market for alternative civilian service.

*ACS labor market supply* depends on: (a) the number of individuals applied for alternative civilian service and (b) the norms of the ACS Law and other legislative and relevant by-laws regulating alternative civilian service<sup>2</sup>. Thus, *social and juridical factors* mainly define supply labor market for alternative civilian service.

*ACS labor market demand* depends on the number of jobs corresponding to the following criteria:

- Social utility,
- No requirements to high qualification and other professional skill,
- Either “free” labor market fails to ensure adequate job supply or ACS worker salary is relatively low in contrast to “normal” employees.

Thus, capacity of ACS labor market from demand side mainly depends on *economic factors*. In this connection, the exterritoriality principle of providing ACS employees with accommodation, on-leave fares and others will make these workers unattractive for the employer if the latter, due to vacancies in the free market, has an opportunity to easily employ any workers it needs.

## **2. Labor supply: alternative civilian service in the mirror of sociological studies**

### **2.1. What is the strength of conscription?**

The studies performed show that 58 % of youths aged 16-28 either have already served their term in the army or to be drafted and 42 % have deferment or exemption from the forced military service. «Main suppliers» of forced military service soldiers are small towns: 40 % of call-up age men live there. Of them, 67 % have already served their time or are to be drafted. A share of the exempted from the forced military service is considerably lower than in large towns and in the country.

Russian statistical year-book (RF State Committee for Statistics) gives distribution of men aged 18-26<sup>3</sup> (Table 1):<sup>4</sup>

**Table 1. Strength of men aged 18-26 for the Russian Federation as a whole**

<b>Men aged</b>	<b>Strength, man</b>
18	1 200 000
19	1 120 000

<sup>2</sup> This is not the same. Evidence is that individuals applied for alternative civilian service failed to prove their rights to such service and they were refused.

<sup>3</sup> A 26-year upper boundary is the age limit, at which a citizen may be drafted so to serve his time at the age of not above 28.

<sup>4</sup> Russian statistical year-book: Official issue. 2001, pages 87-88.

<b>Men aged</b>	<b>Strength, man</b>
20-24	5 471 000
25-26	2 096 000
Total	9 887 000

The sample survey showed that the strength of call-up age youths was as specified in Table 2:

**Table 2. Assessment of groups of men aged 18-26 with respect to military service**

	<b>% in strength of the given age group *</b>	<b>Strength, man</b>
Drafted	11	1 087 570
Deferred	29.5	2 916 665
Fully exempted	15.7	1 552 259
Already served or are serving now	43.8	4 330 506
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>9 887 000 **</b>

\* - data of the sample survey

\*\* - data from the State Committee for Statistics

Thus, the 2001 data show that an annual draft to the forced military service is estimated to 1087 thousand men, disregarding the deferred or exempted.

Conscription statistics<sup>5</sup> shows that in 2001, 382,819 youths have been drafted or 35.2 % of the total number of citizens who are to be drafted and having no deferment or exemption from military service. It means that about 65 % of call-up age youths, who have no deferment or exemption, are evading military service.

According to the Universal Service Law, call-up age is defined up to 28 years old. The VCIOM studies showed that this age group, on one hand, accounted only for 19 to 20 % of total number to be drafted while, on the other hand, among youths aged 18, about 46 % are to be drafted, 45 % are deferred and 11 % are exempted from drafting. Most youths deferred at the present time (mainly because of study) do their military service in the future. The 2001 data show that of the group of men aged 18-28, 43.8 % of them are now serving in the army or have already served their time. In other words, 11 to 13 % of men to be drafted do not mean that other 87 to 89 % will not serve in the army whatever. In reality, a share of such individuals accounts for 56 %.

## **2.2. Why do youths avoid serving in the army?**

Along with the sample survey, call-up respondents in relation to military service may be subdivided into three almost equal groups covering:

- young people who share the Soviet-time basic ideas of heroism and self-sacrifice («each man must go through the army») – 33.9 %;
- young people who do not take military service as a heroism and manhood but consider it in the context of a soldier’s duty («duty they must do») – 31.2 %;
- draft opponents («army is senseless and hazardous occupation, which we must try to avoid») – 29.8 %.

It is necessary to pay attention to the fact that parent’s assessments are greatly differ from each other. Unlike value judgments of the call-up age respondents, their fathers appreciate (and greatly)

<sup>5</sup> Ludmila Vakhnina, member of Council of Remedial Center “Memorial”. How many per cents of young people are drafted? Analytical note.

heroism, manhood and duty. Mothers, on the contrary, consider that military service is senseless and hazardous occupation.

Positions of the youths themselves vary with age. As the call-up age is approaching, less and less young people say about their wish to serve in the army, while the number of young people who want to avoid serving in the army by all means is constantly increasing.

Three main reasons of mass refusal (or mass aversion) to serve in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation may be noted:

- (1) non-regulated army relations between military personnel;
- (2) unsatisfactory life conditions of military personnel;
- (3) participation of the army in combat actions at «hot points».

In addition, another reason has found a rather wide spread recently, saying that military service is the time lost. ACS will not suit these people either if its time is the same as for the military service, let alone a greater time. But as in-depth interviews show such people may be interested in the proposal about reduction of active service to nine months.

### **2.3. Army and ACS: join or not join?**

Let's consider different groups of young people in respect to their social and demographic features and intentions to join the alternative civilian service.

Those young people who *are ready to serve in the army at the call*, (17.9 % of the number of young people of call-up age) mainly represent the citizens of small towns and villages. In any case, they will prefer military service whatever the law on ACS would be adopted. They consider that «each real man must go through the army» and those who dodge the army are afraid of burdens of the army life. They believe that optimal time of service in the army should be two years. These young people know nothing about the alternative civilian service but what's more they are not interesting in this.

Those who *have never served but would have joined the army without particular wishes* account for 36 %. Most young people support cancellation of universal service and reduction of military service at the call to one year. If a "soft" law on the ACS were adopted, they would prefer this alternative civilian service. These youths believe that «service in the army is the duty they must do to the State». This group includes the most of deferred.

The group of those *who have never served and do not want to join the army at all* (30%) considers that «military service is a senseless and hazardous occupation and it is necessary to resort to all means to avoid it». This group is against the army, mainly because of bad conditions of life and loss of several years of active life. They fully support cancellation of drafting or reduction of time of service to one year or even to six months. They approve the alternative civilian service and believe that most conscripts will use their rights to apply for the ACS. They themselves will prefer the ACS, which, they think, shall be regulated by the Labor Code and civil laws. However, if the ACS law is very strong (which is likely to conform to the realities), then they will prefer dodging this service as well. They think that the ACS shall not be harder and not longer than military service. A conscript himself should decide whether to join the ACS or not, giving no grounds of his pacifist views and convictions. This group shows maximum concentration of those young people who are exempted from forced military service.

Youths of call-up age who have not served in the army and *who are thinking about drafting with fear and disgust* (13.5 %) consider that «military service is a senseless and hazardous occupation and it is necessary to try to dodge the service by all means available». They think that those who do not want to be foolish and to lose time uselessly will join the alternative civilian service. This group contains more deferred but not so many fully exempted from military service. These young people consider that the service at the call shall be reduced to half a year while the alternative civilian service

shall be easier than in the army and less long. Like those from the previous group, they think that the Labor Code and civil laws shall regulate the alternative civilian service and the conscript himself shall take a decision to apply for the ACS. A conscript shall not prove his views. These youths would fully support cancellation of drafting.

#### **2.4. What do conscripts know about ACS?**

On average, 74 % of youths and 82 % of parents noted that they heard that the State Duma had been discussing several bills on ACS. But 68 % of youth and 62 % of parents do not know the contents of these laws and differences between them.

Society is poorly aware of the matter, including those, as expected, whom the ACS concerns above all. Qualitative sociological methods, including group discussions, confirm this. At the same time, discussions of the Law norms showed that potential candidates for the ACS especially badly apprehended Par. 2 of Article 4 about extritoriality of the ACS, and also the norm (Article 5, Par. 1) saying that the ACS duration 1.75 times as much as the duration of military service. Focus shall be concentrated on the fact that the interviewed workers of Moscow regional military registration and enlistment offices have been poorly aware of the Law.

#### **2.5. What is the Russian society attitude to the ACS problem?<sup>6</sup>**

There are now few young people «with true religious motives». Therefore an anxiety arises that under present conditions, actually nobody will not agree to join the ACS and the ACS Law will turn out to be unclaimed. But both civil society and the State have still time and potentialities to introduce changes into the Law and to the practice of its implementation so as not to allow it to remain the rarely used norm of little significance.

Now the Law exhibits many «loopholes», which might be used not for the purpose it is intended, thus leading to corruption. For example, the Law contains no information about the conditions, under which a citizen may do his alternative civilian service within his region of the Russian Federation. There is no information too on what and who will determine selection of the organization where a citizen will have to perform the alternative civilian service, who and in what way will control how a citizen does this service and will settle possible disputes between a citizen and an employer.

The studies have revealed eight basic principles, which, as the youth and the officials of the regional military registration and enlistment offices think, shall be the basis for the ACS Law so for the latter not to be nominal but really effective.

*Firstly*, a citizen shall do the alternative civilian service at the place of his residence or at the place to be as close to his residence as possible. *Secondly*, (1) either the ACS period, at today's period of military service of 2 years, shall be set to 2.5 years; (2) or a coefficient shall be introduced with respect to the forced military service (1.2); (3) or make service terms equal. *Thirdly*, period of service, kind of work and payment shall depend on the citizen's education. *Fourthly*, conscripts with a particular family status shall have privileges and deferments (probably not all). *Fifthly*, it is important to note that a youth aged 18 is not quite mature to be a citizen. Even if he is capable of putting his convictions on a sheet of paper (six months before drafting), in the case that the draft board refuses him, he himself will not be able to apply to a court to defend his rights but only through his representative. Therefore, it is necessary to establish some other time for application (well in advance). *Sixthly*, how shall a conscript prove his convictions so as not to conflict with the Constitution? A conscript may present his convictions by writing a composition entitled «Why I do not want to serve in the army». *Seventhly*, a special agency shall be established independent of military organizations to

---

<sup>6</sup> This part of the study is based on the results obtained after group discussions and interviews.

take decisions for the ACS matters. For example, the draft board would give its permission for the alternative civilian service on the basis of the conclusion made by the expert board composed of sociologists and psychologists. *Eighthly*, it is necessary to define clearly all spheres where the ACS employees may work and to exclude possibility of involving them for work on military objects.

## **2.6. How do potential ACS employees motivate their choice?**

Analysis of job selection for alternative civilian service gives evidence that intentions of many conscripts with respect to the alternative civilian service are being far from pacifistic. Many experts consider social services as the main labor market for the ACS workers. But among conscripts, social service has the lowest rating while police service, which cannot be imagined without small arms, on the contrary, is the most desirable<sup>7</sup>.

More than a quarter of respondents give their consent to work at utility enterprises. It means that they are ready to work at industrial enterprises and in other economic spheres since these jobs are rather close to each other as to nature and difficulty of work.

Most conscripts do not associate their intentions to do the alternative civilian service with moral convictions and religion. Only 14.1 % of all conscripts and 14 to 16 % of those who have selected the alternative civilian service instead of the forced military service consider the given motive of the ACS selection as the main. Exactly this part of potential candidates for the ACS are about to press for its right to avoid forced military service.

Regional cut of respondents shows that intentions as regard the alternative civilian service are not concentrated regionally. As to the types of population, among conscripts claimed to the alternative civilian service, 13-15 % are countrymen, 49 to 53 % are concentrated in small towns and 35 to 40 % in large cities.

## **2.7. What is the strength of the «draft» for ACS? Different scenarios**

*Maximum potential number of candidates for the ACS is 13.7 % from the total number of conscripts that corresponds to 149,000 men at a macro level*<sup>8</sup>. This number was found by revealing those who approve the idea of the ACS and try by all means to avoid serving in the army (both because of fear of the army itself and conviction that army is simply a loss of time). Those who try to avoid serving in the army among conscripts account for 18.4 %, but only 74.5 % of them show positive attitude to the idea of the ACS. Thus, the number of 13.7 % follows from this.

It is obvious that the given estimate is very sensitive to the ACS worker employment spheres and methods of their organization.

A factor of exterritorial service is the most powerful. For example, if the ACS is based on exterritorial principles, only those conscripts, who associate the ACS with some convictions, will really apply for it. *The number of such conscripts that claimed to the ACS in social institutions was 8.3 % or of the order of 8,400 men.*

Maximum estimate corresponds to a 3-year ACS, at which conscripts do their alternative civilian service at the places of their residence and in auxiliary troops, fire prevention and police. About 450,000 men will claim in this case to the alternative civilian service. Minimum estimate is

---

<sup>7</sup> According to the Russian legislation, police and fire prevention cannot be suggested at all for the alternative civilian service. This matter has been included into the study on the basis of foreign experience (for example, that of Germany) but it should not be considered erroneous since a number of interesting aspects have been discovered. In particular, it has been found that pacifistic and religious convictions were far from being the main grounds for selecting the alternative civilian service in contrast to the forced military service.

<sup>8</sup> This estimate is based disregarding the ACS duration, its conditions (at the place of residence or exterritoriality) and spheres of possible employment of the ACS workers.

4,200 men, which corresponds to the exterritorial 4-year service at the enterprises of social sphere (Table 3, Fig. 1).



independent institute for  
**SOCIAL POLICY**


**Table 3. Strength of conscripts ready to do alternative civilian service. Scenarios**

ACS sphere	ACS will be organized									
	At the place of residence				Exterritorially					
	3 years		4 years		3 years			4 years		
	% of drafted	man	% of drafted	man	% of those selected ACS at the place of residence	% of drafted	man	% of those selected ACS at the place of residence	% of drafted	man
<i>Conscripts will agree to join ACS if</i>										
they have a wide choice of service (in fire prevention units, auxiliary troops, police, social institutions, public utility)	40.6	441553	21.9	238178	13.6	5.5	60051	16.1	3.5	38347
they do service in fire prevention units, auxiliary troops and police	32.4	352373	17.5	190325	13.3	4.3	46866	13.3	2.3	25313
they do service in social sphere or public utility	19.9	216426	11.7	127246	12.2	2.4	26404	13.3	1.6	16924
they do service only in social sphere	9.4	102232	5.0	54379	8.3	0.8	8485	7.7	0.4	4187

*For reference: to be drafted — 1087570 men*



**Fig. 1. Estimate of potential strength of ACS workers at different ACS duration, % of conscription strength**



### **3. Labor market demand for alternative civilian service: economic and statistical analysis of jobs**

#### **3.1. Analysis of number and structure of jobs for ACS**

At a special request, data on vacancies have been obtained from the regional employment services and analyzed to make sure they conform to the requirements for the ACS jobs. On this basis, all vacancies have been combined into three groups:

- so called «pure» vacancies;
- «conventional» vacancies;
- vacancies of little use for ACS.

“Pure” vacancy criteria are social significance, low skill requirements and relative prevalence at labor markets. These vacancies practically fully conform to the ACS employment requirements. *These are mainly personnel of medical and child institutions (hospital attendants, junior nurse boys, hospital nurses, nurses at kindergartens, etc.).*

“Conventional” vacancy criteria are low skill requirements, execution of infra-structural functions relatively common for economy, and economic expediency of filling these vacancies with ACS employees (that is, these are the vacancies, which are not filled with traditional unemployed groups, with high rotation and alike). These vacancies might also be referred to as potential jobs for

the ACS. However, a number of supplementary procedures will be required to enter these vacancies into the ACS vacancy bank. It is obvious that either extra examination of skill demands or more precise definition of jobs the employer provides will be needed. *This group includes personnel, which mainly perform infra-structural functions in economy.*

Referred to the vacancies of little use were the jobs that require particular skills and higher qualification, i.e., *personnel, which perform special functions in the budget and off-budget sectors of economy.*

**Table 4. Number and structure of jobs for ACS in Russian labor market**

Vacancy nature	Number
Pure vacancies	15 133
Conventional vacancies	95 732
Pure and conventional vacancies, sub-total:	110 865
Vacancies of little use	70 332
Sub-total	181 197

Table 5 lists professions (vacancies) suitable for ACS. Regions need that vacancies of these professions are to be filled.

**Table 5. List of professions with the largest number of vacancies, among professions suitable for the ACS**

Profession	Wage category	Number of regions that need specialists of the given profession
Hospital attendant, also as cleaner	1-2	53
Territory cleaner, yard-cleaner, etc.	1	46
Maintenance worker (also as loader, roadman and fireman)	1-2	38
Janitor; watchman, also as janitor, doorman, porter	1-2	37
Gas-man, electric gas-man, electric welder, hand electric welder	1-6	30
Carpenter, also as joiner, joiner, building joiner	2-6	30
Sanitary technician, also as metalworker	2-6	29
Cleaner (+charwomen)	1-3	28
Loader	1-2	27
Cleaner of production and service spaces, stairwells	1-2	23
Metalworker, also for emergency and recovery work, operation and repair of gas equipment, mechanic, worker of housing and communal services	2-6	23

Most comparable are the values calculated by the data of 43 regions, which supplied information on the number of vacancies on July 1, 2002 (Table 6).

**Table 6. Number of vacancies for ACS\***

Vacancies	Number of vacancies in regions	Cumulative sum
In social services	8 606	8 606
In public utilities	44 335	52 941
In fire prevention units, auxiliary troops, police, etc.	40 764	93 705

\* -for 43 regions of RF



independent institute for  
**SOCIAL POLICY**

**Table 7. Scenario estimates of strength of conscripts who are ready to join the ACS\***

ACS sphere	ACS will be organized									
	At the place of residence				Exterritorially					
	3 years		4 years		3 years			4 years		
	% of drafted	man	% of drafted	man	% of those selected ACS at the place of residence	% of drafted	man	% of those selected ACS at the place of residence	% of drafted	man
<i>Conscripts will agree to join ACS if:</i>										
they have a wide choice of service (in fire prevention units, auxiliary troops, police, social institutions, public utility)	40,6	239 388	21,9	129 128	13,5	5,5	32 429	16,0	3,5	20 637
they do service in social sphere or public utility	19,9	117 336	11,7	68 986	12,1	2,4	14 151	13,7	1,6	9 434
they do service only in social sphere	9,4	55 425	5,0	29 481	8,5	0,8	4 717	8,0	0,4	2 359

\* - for 43 regions

For reference: 589,626 men are to be drafted in 43 regions; calculations of conscript strength have appreciated Russia's population (RF State Committee for Statistics) (as of January 1, 200) in 43 regions of Russia.


Given the relation between supply and demand in the ACS labor market, i.e., relation between vacancies suitable for the ACS (Table 6) and number of conscripts who are ready to join the ACS (Table 7), Table 8 may be presented as follows.

**Table 8. Relation between supply and demand in the ACS labor market\***

Vacancies	Demand for ACS workers	Labor supply of ACS workers, man		Supply-demand situation, %	
	Number of vacancies	3 years	4 years	3 years	4 years
In social services	8 606	4 717	2 359	55	27
In social services and public utilities	52 941	14 151	9 434	27	18
In social services and public utilities, fire prevention units, auxiliary troops, police, etc.	93 705		20 637		22

\* - for 43 regions of RF

**Fig. 2. Supply and demand at the ACS labor market at different scenarios of the ACS (relation between the ACS workers and vacancies, fractions of unit)**



As is shown in Fig 2, relations between supply and demand in the ACS labor market are rather sensitive to a change both in employment spheres and in the methods of the ACS organization.

There is a scenario, which might help find a certain balance between supply and demand. This balance will be possible if conscripts are allowed to do their alternative civilian service at the place of their residence and to work not only in the social services but also in public utility.

**3.2. ACS through the eyes of employers and experts of employment services<sup>9</sup>**

What are the real prospects of the ACS workers employment? The answer to this question depends on the interests and behavior of potential employers. But their attitude to the ACS

<sup>9</sup> A series of qualitative expert interviews within the frameworks of project «Alternative civilian service in Russia: labor relations and social and economic problems» was conducted. Interviewed were head physicians and deputy head physicians of a number of hospitals of Moscow and also an official of the Health Committee of Moscow.

employees is different now. Employers, on one hand, confirm acute shortage of labor force for a number of jobs suitable by their nature to the alternative civilian service while, on the other hand, they point out that there is a whole number of contradictions and vagueness in the norms of the Law adopted.

In this connection, experts raise the following questions pertinent to the ACS:

- *Will the ACS Law be realized in practice?*  
Potential employers consider that the present ACS Law is more likely formal, i.e., adopted so that the Russia's legal base could contain the rights and freedoms peculiar to the democratic state.
- *Is it expedient to establish principle of exterritoriality for the ACS?*  
Experts criticize this principle because of a number of reasons. The most forcible argument "against" is that now employers cannot provide accommodation for the ACS-employees.
- *How to organize supervision over workers?*  
A risk exists that on the whole employers will not be interested in hiring the ACS-employees because of the following reasons. Low payment of such employees gives no advantages to the employers because they have to pay for the worker accommodation and on-leave fare and what's more they cannot dismiss the workers without strong reasons for this.

Experts from regional employment services have also different attitudes to the ACS problem. They fear that the ACS employees will compete with pensioners and people near pension ages who usually occupy such low-paid vacancies. The latter might be forced out from the labor market thus provoking a growth of unemployment and social tension.

#### **4. How much will alternative civilian service cost? Estimates of expenses of the state budget**

Article 8 of the Law adopted says that means of federal budget, budgets of the Russian Federation regions, as well as budgets of organizations and off-budget sources will be used for paying for organizing the alternative civilian service and securing the rights and social guarantees for the citizens being on the ACS.

##### **4.1. Main items of expenses for the ACS system. Estimation of budget expenses for the ACS**

The following types of expenses (Table 9) will occur when the ACS starts:

**Table 9. Main costs for the ACS organization. Basic activities with information sources for calculation of their costs**

<b>Main expenses for ACS organization</b>	<b>Basic activities for calculation of expenses</b>	<b>Information sources</b>
Remuneration of labor	Minimum salary in RF; average salary in the ACS region	Statistical data of RF State Committee for Statistics

Taxes charged	Established rates within the Unified Social Tax (UST)	(1) Articles of RF Tax Code; (2) Data on actual collection of UST to off-budget funds and to the state pension fund
Housing payment	A share of housing payments within household budgets	Statistical data of RF State Committee for Statistics
Transport expenses	Railway/air fare, per 1 km	Statistical data of RF State Committee for Statistics
Occupational training	Average costs of occupational training for unemployed	Database of Ministry of Labor and Social Development of Russia

If we sum up value of each component of the ACS organization costs, we shall obtain the total amount of budget expenses for the ACS (Table 10).

**Table 10. Budget expenses for the ACS organization: different scenarios**

Scenarios	Costs of ACS organization (million rubles)						% of expenses of consolidated budget of RF in 2001*
	Remuneration of labor	Housing payment	Wage taxes charged	Transport expenses	Payment for occupational training	Total budget	
<b>Scenario 1</b> (ACS in social sphere)	115,0	5,5	41,2	11,5	3,1	<b>176,3</b>	<b>0,007</b>
<b>Scenario 2</b> (ACS in social sphere and in utility)	462,6	22,3	165,6	46,3	12,6	<b>709,4</b>	<b>0,029</b>
<b>Scenario 3</b> (ACS in social sphere and utility, in fire prevention units, police)	1 048,4	50,5	375,3	104,9	28,5	<b>1 607,6</b>	<b>0,067</b>

\*For reference: total expenses of consolidated budget of RF in 2001 accounted for 2,407,500 rubles.

## Conclusion

One can consider the ACS in Russia from two perspectives. On one hand, the ACS is a new element of political freedom in the context of citizen rights set forth in the Constitution. On the other hand, the ACS might bring economic benefit as an institute that compensates for a shortage of labor force within certain segments of labor market. It would be logically for the governmental authorities to balance these two objects.

In political respect, the study showed that two types of relations might be established between the law and society.

*The first type* arises if the ACS Law is implemented as adopted and pursues two goals, i.e. firstly, meets the international standards and secondly, gives no opportunity to use this Law for those who just want to avoid serving in the army.

The study showed that all, without exceptions, concerned subjects had interpreted the ACS Law in the context of negative attitude of a great part of society to do active military service in the

Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. This attitude is a part of sophisticated complex of the state and public problems pertinent not only to the army but also to the behavior of the youth on the education and labor markets, their support of internal and external policy of the State and others.

Representatives of military departments, a part of lawmakers and some part of population have their own points of view. They are afraid that the ACS might provide a «loophole for those who want to dodge the army». A greater period of the alternative civilian service, principle of exterritoriality, possibility of doing service on the territory of military units and a number of other norms of the law will help realize their intentions. Interpretation of a citizen right for alternative civilian service instead of forced military service, mainly on a *religious basis*, will act in the same direction. The study showed that all parties, exactly on this ground, saw the best opportunity for a conscript to prove his claims and for the draft board, to agree with him. Interviewed experts expect that such use of the ACS Law will refer to a very few number of conscripts. Of course, under such variant, one shall always have an opportunity of declaring to the world's community that the democratic law in Russia exists and religious rights of minorities are preserved. But it will mean that the appropriate constitutional norm and appropriate law are not implemented in no way in reality to settle the knot of problems mentioned above. What is more, a part of young people will be simply deceived in their expectations that present legislative and executive authorities, having a rather large credibility from population and from the youth, will be able to place civilian interests above the interests of the military departments.

*The second type* of the Law interpretation might be realized in society in that understanding of the letter and the spirit of the Law, which meets the positions of public opinion. It is a question of the law norm (Article 2) stating that a citizen has the right for the alternative civilian service instead of the forced military service if military service is in conflict with his *convictions*. A lawmaker evidently admits that it is possible that loyal citizens of Russia have convictions that prevent them from serving in the army. This study revealed that there was a group of young people to be drafted, who did not want to serve in the army exactly because of their civil convictions. But the Law tells about convictions, with which military service is conflict in general. Our study shows that such views are found but rather seldom. They do not represent a great social problem.

Much more often conscripts express their principle readiness to do their duties to the society by serving in the army, noting at the same time that they refuse or do not want to serve in the present RF Armed Forces. It is known that such position is formally condemned both by military departments and by a number of public circles and organizations as an egoistic, anti-state and anti-patriotic position.

But our study revealed and confirmed that, firstly, supporters of such points of view are found in the army itself and in military departments and, secondly, they justify such views as quite civil and patriotic. The ACS supporters would like to find such a means in the appropriate constitutional norm and the Law so as be able of expressing their position, i.e., requests to establish the alternative to the present organization of the Armed Forces in the interests of the Fatherland. These people support the army reforms being now discussed in public and suggest that the ACS should be discussed in the context of these reforms as one of the means that will help improve relations between the army and society.

Assessing political and social value of the ACS problem as worded in the Law, we are of opinion that nobody can speak now about a new political freedom of the Russia's citizens when the ACS accounts for 4,200 men. In this respect, political advantage from the ACS is practically insignificant. But estimating economic value of the problem, we may say that the adopted wording of the Law deprives the State of the possibility to solve the whole number of problems on the labor market and in the social sphere.

The number of call-up age young people, who applied for the alternative civilian service, defines the ACS labor market supply. Sociological analysis showed that, under relatively rigid norms of the Law that set forth high duration for the ACS and principle of exterritoriality, only

those youths would apply for the ACS who firmly defend their visions or religious principles. This group is very small not exceeding 4,100 men a year. But we are not sure whether all of them will manage to cope with the formalities, which will practically accompany the ACS introduction. Therefore the real number of the ACS employees might turn out to be below specified.

As to the ACS labor market demand, economic and statistical analysis gave the following estimates:

I. If vacancies of exclusively social sphere are admitted suitable for the ACS, then:

- 1) In case of exterritorial principles and service duration of 4 years, conscripts will fill less than 1/3 of vacancies available in social sphere.
- 2) If service duration is reduced to 3 years and exterritorial principles are preserved, conscripts will fill nearly more than 1/2 of vacancies available in social sphere.
- 3) Even if the 4-year service duration remains unchanged but the ACS is allowed at the place of residence, individuals who wish to serve will be still 3.5 times as many as vacancies.
- 4) If service duration is 3 years and allowed at the place of residence in social sphere, then conscript supply will 6 times exceed the norm.

II. If both vacancies in social sphere and in utility are admitted suitable for the ACS, then:

- 1) Less than 1/5 of vacancies in social sphere and utility will be demanded for the ACS provided a 4-year exterritorial service is restored.
- 2) Even in case of a 3-year exterritorial service, conscripts will fill not more than 1/3 of vacancies in social institutions and in utility.
- 3) In case of transfer to the ACS at the place of residence even at 4-year service, more than 20% of candidates for the ACS will fail to find job because of vacancy shortage.
- 4) In case of a 3-year ACS at the place of residence, one may expect that supply will 2 times exceed the jobs available in social spheres.

III. If spectrum of the ACS vacancies is added with the professions associated with service in fire prevention units, auxiliary troops, police, then:

- 1) Individuals, who wish to do alternative civilian service for 4 years exterritorially, will exceed almost 5 times vacant jobs.
- 2) If service period is reduced to 3 years at the same exterritorial principles, the number of candidates for the ACS will not exceed the vacancies as before, i.e., about 2/3 of jobs will be vacant.
- 3) As soon as the scenario for the ACS at the place of residence is adopted, even at a 4-year ACS, vacancies will be still lacking and about 27% of those who wish to do their alternative civilian service will fail to get jobs.
- 4) In case of transfer to a 3-year ACS at the place of residence, labor supply excess will account for above 150%. In other words, only about 40% of candidates for the ACS will be able to start their alternative service.

It is obvious that relation between supply and demand on the ACS labor market is rather sensitive to a change both in employment spheres and in the ways of the ACS organization. Principle of exterritoriality is a divide. It is important that principle of exterritoriality has a greater influence than the ACS duration on the youth intentions to apply for the ACS. Even if service period increases to 4 years but the possibility exists to serve at the place of residence, the number of candidates turns out to be much greater (54,000 men or 5 % of the conscript number) than at a

smaller service period of 3 years but in the other regions of Russia (4,200 men or only 0.4 % of the draft strength).

In line with today's version of the Law the market segment, where supply will find demand and vice versa, will be probably extremely limited within the frameworks of legally established norms. But a small labor market is economically unprofitable to neither of its agents. Specific transaction expenses might turn out to be very high both for the organs of state administration (establishment and work of commissions, establishment of special organs and procedures for employing the ACS workers, supervision over the ACS and others) and for the employer (housing, training, briefing, working hours control and others). Although estimation of extra finance resources allocated from the consolidated budget to support the ACS (at its so small scopes) is not dramatic and accounts for maximum 0.067 % in the total expenses of the budget, it is necessary to note two important aspects.

Firstly, it is possible that, at a salary equal to the subsistence wage, financial position of the ACS employee in reality will be very poor in either form (allowance, subsidy and others) and therefore extra expenses cannot be avoided. In other words, estimation of expenses for the ACS only on the basis of living wage turns out to be understated.

Secondly, in case of exterritorial ACS, the employer's expenses might still prove to be essential. Our analysis shows that in any case one cannot be sure that the employer will choose the ACS employees arrived from the other region of Russia and not "ordinary" job-seekers offering their labor in the local labor market.

Thus, as we can see, a rocking beam lies exactly in the plane of exterritoriality. A balance on the labor market is possible only if conscripts will do their alternative civilian service at the place of residence and if they can work not only in social sphere but also in municipal economy. Note that exactly the norm of exterritoriality for the ACS is worded in the Law in the non-directive form and contains a word «normally», which allows a freer use of this norm in practice. These are exactly those points that might help settle all contradictions on the ACS labor market. If the State uses this «opportunities», it will be able of solving a serious problem associated with a constant shortage of labor force for socially useful and important jobs. If this change is ignored, the ACS Law might become a «law of missed opportunities».